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Abstract
This paper uses panel Granger causality tests to study the relationship between sector
specific FDI and CO2 emissions. Using a sample of 18 Latin American countries for the
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I.

Introduction

The share of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to less developed countries
(LDCs) as a share of total world FDI has increased from 25% in the 1990s to 31% in the
2000s.1 These inflows have been encouraged and welcomed by LDCs because of the
important role they play in domestic economies as a source of growth and job creation.
However, there are concerns that LDCs could competitively undercut each other’s
environmental regulations to attract FDI (Elliot and Shimamoto, 2008). This “race to the
bottom” in LDCs may result in these countries becoming “pollution havens”, where
multinational corporations (MNCs) locate operations in order to save on environmental
related costs. In this scenario, the MNCs that have more to gain from relocating are those
in the most polluting intensive or “dirty” industries. Therefore, as LDCs continue to
attract significant shares of FDI flows, it is important to assess whether FDI inflows to
LDCs are associated with higher levels of pollution.
In this study, we analyse the link between FDI and CO2 emissions in Latin America
from 1980 to 2007. In particular, we conduct a panel Granger causality test of the
relationship between FDI and CO2 emissions. This approach allows us to address two
important issues. First, it helps us to obtain more reliable estimates on the relationship
between FDI and CO2 emissions by addressing causality in the relationship. Second,
since we are working with macro data, a panel approach allows us to increase the number
of observations significantly and to draw conclusions that are region specific. In addition,
our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data disaggregated by sectors.
Therefore, we are able to explore whether increases on FDI in pollution intensive sectors
are associated with higher CO2 emissions in Latin America.

Latin America is an interesting case study for exploring the relation between FDI
and CO2 emissions. This region receives the most capital inflows to LDCs after Asia,
with a share of total FDI inflows around 30% (UNCTAD, 2010). In addition, as
developing countries continue to grow, their CO2 emissions have become an important
issue in international agreements related to trade and the environment.
The results of our study indicate that FDI inflows in the pollution intensive sectors
can be linked to increases in CO2 emissions, but the same relationship does not hold for
FDI in other sectors. Hence, policy makers in the region could benefit from considering
this differentiated environmental impact of FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we discuss the
relationship between FDI and pollution with a review of the current literature. Section III
provides a theoretical framework. Section IV describes the data used in the analysis,
while section V covers the methodology. The discussion of the results with robustness
tests is included in Section VI, and Section VII concludes.

II. FDI and the Environment: A Review of the Literature
There is considerable literature studying FDI flows into LDCs. This interest is due, to
some degree, to the significant increases of FDI inflows to LDCs over the last decade.
Moreover, FDI has attracted attention as a potential engine to economic growth in
emerging economies. The benefits of FDI on growth stem from its long-term nature, the
creation of capital stock and employment and the transfer of skills and technology that
lead to greater productivity (Borensztein, et al., 1999). These potential benefits of FDI
over other types of capital inflows and the interest of MNCs to relocate have made

attracting FDI an important component of the economic agenda in many emerging
economies. Therefore, there is a strong competition among LDCs to attract FDI.
An important issue is whether lax environmental standards are part of the increasing
desire of MNCs to relocate abroad. It is possible that the competition among LDCs may
have induced a "race to the bottom” in relation to environmental regulation, where
pollution-intensive MNCs relocate to LDCs with less stringent environmental standards
(Xing and Kolstad, 2002). This is known as the "pollution haven" hypothesis (Grossman
and Krueger, 1991; Mani and Wheeler, 1998). The empirical evidence has been mixed,
with various studies finding no support for the pollution haven hypothesis (Mani and
Wheeler, 1998; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; MacDermott, 2009 and Wagner and
Timmins, 2009).
The lack of consistent evidence in favor the pollution haven hypothesis may suggest
that environmental regulations are unlikely to have an effect on plant location since the
MNCs savings from lower environmental regulation could be small. Moreover, it is
possible that pollution intensive industries relocating to LDCs can have cleaner
production methods than similar domestic industries (see Grossman and Krueger, 1991).
According to this view, FDI to LDCs may bring cleaner technologies in the long run.
Likewise, it is expected that domestic firms will eventually acquire the cleaner
technologies of foreign firms. This view is known as the “pollution halo” hypothesis and
supports the notion that the presence of foreign-owned firms may yield substantial
environmental benefits to LDCs (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Zarsky, 1999; Antweiler,
et al., 2001; Birdsall and Wheeler, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001). In general, the

empirical evidence on the link between FDI and pollution has been ambiguous and
concrete policy recommendations are difficult to make.
A possible explanation of the ambiguity in the empirical results across studies lies in
the differences in the scope (or question) and the empirical approach (including
differences in econometric methodologies, lack of comparable data, and proxies). The
empirical approach to study the relationship between FDI and the environment can be
seen from two perspectives. One approach relates to the studies that attempt to assess if
firms choose to locate in countries with low environmental standards by using industry
level data, measures of environmental stringency and pollution intensities by industries
(using pollution abatement expenditures either at home and/or abroad). The majority of
this work is composed of case studies or firm level analysis. A source of concern with
this approach is that it is difficult to measure and to account for environmental stringency
(Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Albornoz, et al., 2009; Wagner and Timmins, 2009).
A second approach in the literature has concentrated on the impact of FDI on the
environment. That is, once firms are located in other countries it is expected that the
pollution levels will increase. In this context, it is argued that pollution levels could also
work as a proxy of environmental stringency. Studying the empirical link between FDI
and pollution is still a difficult task. Available data on country level FDI for developing
countries tends to be at the aggregate level while FDI as a cause of pollution might be
more related to certain types of industries. Moreover, pollution data by industry seldom
exists for these types of countries.
An additional limitation of both approaches is that most of the existing analyses do
not study the causality between FDI, environmental policy and pollution. Causality is

important since it is possible that MNCs relocate to countries which already have high
pollution concentrations. Conversely, MNCs may relocate to LDCs, and this will lead to
an increase in pollutants concentrations. Moreover, these two situations are not mutually
exclusive. In the literature, the most common approach assumes environmental regulation
(or pollution) as a function of FDI or vice-versa. Since the impact of FDI on pollution
may go both ways, the empirical methodology should take into account this bidirectionality. Only few studies have addressed this type of problem by conducting a
causality or cointegration analysis (see Hoffmann, et al., 2005; Merican, et al., 2007;
Acharyya, 2009; Lee, 2009). These studies have found that, in most instances, FDI can
clearly be linked to pollution or environmental damage. In the next section we discuss the
current literature and some of the trends of FDI and pollution in the case of Latin
America.

FDI and the Environment in Latin America
The environmental consequences of globalization have been subject to a global
heated debate. According to the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)
in the last twenty years LDCs have more than doubled their carbon dioxide emissions
(CDIAC). Moreover, developing countries are Annex II countries under the Kyoto
protocol and are exempt from any mandatory emissions reduction.2 In Latin America,
total CO2 emissions have been on the rise. Moreover, CDIAC reports that four countries
of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) belong to the list of countries
producing 90 percent of the world carbon dioxide emissions. Mexico and Brazil alone

account for 52.7 percent of the 2007 regional emissions and belong in the list of top 20
highest fossil-fuel CO2 emitting countries (Marland, et al., 2008).3
FDI flows to Latin America have increased dramatically over the past decades.
Figure 1 illustrates the trends of pollution intensive and non-pollution intensive FDI,
where both categories have been on the rise. Although there was a dramatic fall in FDI in
2000-2001, possibly because of the volatility in macroeconomic fundamentals in 1999,
the 2000 Argentinean crisis and the 2001 US recession; the trend has in general been
positive. Figure 2 depicts the trend of pollution intensive FDI as a share of total FDI, and
it shows that the participation of dirty industries on total FDI has been relatively stable
over time. Moreover, when looking at FDI flows into pollution intensive sectors
disaggregated by industry, we find that the industries with the highest growth were
mining, oil and chemical (Figure 3).
There is a scant literature on the relationship between FDI and pollution for the case
of Latin America. Most of these studies are limited by the scope of the data used and, in
most cases, they rely on a small sample period or a small number of observations.
Moreover, most of the research for the region is country specific, and very few empirical
studies have considered the region as a whole. In general, the overall evidence on the
relationship between FDI and emissions is, at best, mixed.
Some studies, such as Cole and Ensign (2005), MacDermott (2006), Barbier and
Hultberg (2007), and Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) among others, have found evidence
that MNCs locate operations in Latin America as a result of low environmental standards.
MacDermott (2006), for example, finds that FDI from the United States can be associated
with the pollution haven hypothesis after NAFTA. Conversely, Biglaiser and Staats

(2008) is one of the most recent studies that do not find support for the pollution haven
hypothesis for Latin America, they use a survey of American executives of corporations
with presence in Latin America and find that investment risk is the main factor driving
FDI in the region. Additionally, Grossman and Krueger (1991), Carrada-Bravo (1995),
and Cole and Ensign (2005) do not find empirical evidence that Mexico became a
pollution haven with NAFTA. Furthermore, Birdsall, et al., (2001) find support for the
“pollution halo” hypothesis in the case of Chile.
Our paper contributes to the above literature by looking at the causal relationships
between FDI and the CO2 emissions. We take a panel approach, which increases the
number of observations significantly and allows us to draw conclusions that are region
specific. In addition, our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data
disaggregated by sectors. We explore whether FDI in certain sectors is associated with
greater emissions in Latin America. Moreover, our methodology differs from previous
analyses as we incorporate time series econometric techniques that provide more reliable
estimates on the relationship between FDI and pollution. Next, we describe the
theoretical framework, the data used in our analysis and the econometric methodology.

III. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework loosely follows Baumol and Oates (1988) and List and Co
(2000). Since pollutant emissions are generated during production, we can consider
without loss of generality that these emissions are inputs to the production process.
Hence, the profits of a plant in region j are given by the following equation:

π j = PQ − PG G − P Z Z

(1)

where G is the vector of inputs and other characteristics which include labor, capital,
distance to the markets, export and import taxes. Z is the amount of emissions used in
production and PZ is the unit price of emissions. Setting

ηG =

G*
Z*
,ηz =
where
Q*
Q*

the superscript asterisk indicates the profit maximizing choice, the profits of the firm can
be expressed as follows:

π *j = ( P − η G PG − η Z PZ )Q *

(2)

Equation (2) shows profits as a function of the input intensities and their prices. In
the absence of any environmental regulation, the private marginal cost of emissions is
zero (that is PZ = 0 ). PZ will increase with higher or more stringent environmental
regulation. Thus, the degree that environmental regulation (as reflected in PZ ) can affect
the firm’s profits depends on the pollution intensity of production. The profits of firms
with high η Z will be more sensitive to changes in PZ . Therefore in our analysis we
concentrate on whether FDI in industries with high pollution intensities has a differential
effect on pollution.
Thus, other things equal a firm will relocate to the region where PZ is the lowest.
However, in many cases a new location implies also a new set of prices PG associated
with different cost of labor, energy transportation, and imports and exports tariffs. It is
likely that once a plant faces different prices, the input intensities will also change.
This implies that FDI will flow from a region with strong to non-existent (or weak)
environmental regulations if the following condition is satisfied:

π

*
j ,s

= ( P − η G ,s PG ,s − η Z ,s PZ ,s )Q * < ( P − η G ,w PG ,w )Q w* = π

*
j ,w

(3)

where the subscript s denotes if the region enforces environmental regulations and w is
the region without environmental regulations. To simplify Equation (3) we can assume
that PZ = 0 in the region with weak environmental regulation. Under the condition
shown in Equation (3), the region with low environmental restrictions will receive FDI
from high pollution intensity industries. However, notice that, as mentioned before, other
inputs and characteristics in G can affect the location decision of the plant.
The location decision of the firm will depend on the actual values of the parameters
in Equation (3) which requires estimating these values. Since it is difficult to compile
firm level data consistent throughout the region to estimate the profit function for each
plant, we look at FDI inflows to Latin American countries and sorted by different sectors
in order to assess their effect on CO2 emissions. That is, if the condition above holds then
we would expect to observe that pollution intensive industries would relocate to countries
with lax environmental regulation, leading to higher emissions in these countries.

IV. Data
Our pollution measure is the growth in CO2 emissions per capita. CO2 is a pollutant
commonly used in the literature because of its contribution to global warming, and it is
generally involved as a main variable of concern in international agreements
(Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; Hoffmann, et al., 2005;
MacDermott, 2006; Merican, et al., 2007; Acharyya, 2009; MacDermott, 2009).
Furthermore, CO2 emissions are the only indicator related to the environment that is
available consistently over time for Latin American countries.

Previous work has used CO2 emissions growth (Hoffmann, et al., 2005), total CO2
emissions (Acharyya, 2009), CO2 emissions to GDP ratio (MacDermott, 2009) and CO2
emissions per capita in levels (Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; MacDermott, 2006). Few
other papers have used other pollution measures such as SO2, NOx and PT (see Xing and
Kolstad, 2002; MacDermott, 2006; and Waldkirch and Gopinat, 2008). We place
emphasis on the growth of CO2 emissions per capita since total emissions can be
associated with population growth (see MacDermott, 2006). We construct the growth of
CO2 emissions per capita as the first difference of the natural log of CO2 emissions per
capita. For the purpose of robustness, we use an alternative indicator of pollution. We use
the growth of the CO2 emissions to GDP ratio at 2005 constant international dollars
(using purchasing power parity rates; where growth is constructed as the difference of the
natural log). Both indicators of CO2 emissions were obtained from the World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2010).
Regarding FDI, we expand the literature by considering FDI inflows disaggregated
by sector. As mentioned in Section III, plants in sectors with higher pollution intensity
would be, at least in theory, more likely to be located in regions with weak environmental
regulations. Therefore, to determine the type of capital inflows that are more detrimental
to the environment we consider the three main different sectors: primary, secondary, and
tertiary. We believe that this sectoral disaggregation for Latin America is an important
contribution since most of the existing literature uses aggregate measures of FDI.
Roughly speaking, the primary sector includes agricultural and mining activities, the
secondary sector manufacturing activities, and the tertiary sector services. Table 1 shows
a description of the industries/sectors included in each category. However, some

industries within the sectors have vast differences in pollution intensities. Therefore, we
consider an additional indicator that aggregates FDI in pollution intensive industries only.
Considering FDI in pollution intensive industries is also a key contribution of this paper.
The methodology to categorise an industry as pollution intensive varies in the
literature. For example, Kahn (2003) uses energy use and the toxic inventory, whereas
List and Co (2000) considers emissions by industry and pollution abatement operating
expenditures. Jaffe et al. (1995) and Levinson (1996) use pollution abatement capital
expenditures as a percentage of new or total capital expenditures to compute an indicator
of pollution intensity. Table 1 shows the industries that were considered as pollution
intensive in some of the previous studies. Despite the differences in the number and detail
of sectors, as well as in the methodology to obtain the pollution intensity, there are vast
similarities in the industries labeled as pollution intensive. For example, chemicals,
petroleum and primary metals are regarded as pollution intensive by most of these
studies. Based on this information and the available data on disaggregated FDI, we
categorise as pollution intensive: mining, quarrying and petroleum, wood and wood
products, paper and paper products, chemicals and chemical products, non-metallic
mineral products, metal and metal products, electrical and electronic equipment, and
motor vehicles and other transport equipment. Hence, we create a pollution intensive or
“dirty” sector comprised of these industries.
We also construct FDI inflows in different sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary,
dirty) as a share of GDP. The data on FDI disaggregated by sector comes from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development Data Extract Service Desk
(UNCTAD/DITE, 2010). We construct FDI by sector as a share of GDP using data from

the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2010), and use the natural log of the sectoral
FDI inflow as a share of GDP.
Other control variables considered in the analysis are real GDP per capita (in
constant 2000 US dollars) and the manufacturing value added share of GDP. We are
interested in the growth of these variables, where both indicators are used as the first
difference of the natural log and were obtained from the WDI (2010). The 18 Latin
American countries considered for the estimations are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. The
period of analysis considered is between 1980 and 2007.4 Tables 2 and 3 present a
description and the summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis.

V. Methodology
We use a Granger causality test in order to determine the relationship between
sectoral FDI inflows and pollution emissions. The Granger causality test is based on the
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework. Our empirical methodology contributes to the
literature in the following two ways. First, our analysis focuses on Latin America and
uses sectoral FDI. To our knowledge, there is no other analysis that looks at the region as
a whole and uses a data on FDI by sector. We specifically test the impact of FDI inflows
in those industries that are considered the most polluting. Second, we expand on previous
work by using a Granger causality test in a framework that takes into consideration
country characteristics and time specific effects. To check the robustness of our results
we: i) extend our analysis to a multivariate VAR, where we control for other variables

related to CO2 emissions and ii) use CO2 emissions to GDP ratio as an alternative
indicator of emissions.
The modeling used for our Granger causality test, which relates to Hoffmann’s et al.
(2005) analysis, is explained in detail below. The panel VAR framework used in this
analysis is specified as follows:
k

k

j =1

j =1

k

k

j =1

j =1

y i ,t = ∑α j x i ,t − j + ∑ β j y i ,t − j + a i + τ t + e i ,t
x i ,t = ∑ δ j x i ,t − j + ∑ γ j y i ,t − j + a i + τ t + e i ,t

(4)

(5)

Where y represents the growth of CO2 emissions per capita and x is the FDI inflows in a
specific sector. The subscript i represents the country (i =1, 2, … N) and t represents the
time period (t = 1, 2, … T). k represents the number of lags of the variables y and x
included as regressors, and ai and τt represent the country and time fixed effects. It is
assumed that x and y are stationary and that the error term in both equations is
uncorrelated white noise.
We have an unbalanced panel for the estimations of equations 4 and 5 due to missing
observations for the sectoral FDI variables. The Granger causality test for our analysis
takes the following steps. First, using equation 4 to test causality from FDI to pollution,
we set the following hypotheses:
k

Ho:

∑α

j

= 0 , where FDI does not cause CO2 emissions per capita growth

j

≠ 0 , where FDI does cause CO2 emissions per capita growth

j =1
k

Ha:

∑α
j =1

An F statistic is constructed using the normal Wald test for the coefficient restrictions. If
Ho is rejected, then we can conclude that there is evidence that FDI in a specific sector
Granger causes CO2 emissions per capita growth. If we fail to reject Ho, there is no
evidence of causality running from sectoral FDI to CO2 emissions.
Second, to test causality from CO2 emissions to sectoral FDI, we use equation 5 and
set the following hypotheses:
k

Ho:

∑γ

j

= 0 , where CO2 emissions growth does not cause FDI inflows

j

≠ 0 , where CO2 emissions growth does cause FDI inflows

j =1
k

Ha:

∑γ
j =1

In this case, rejecting Ho will lead to conclude that CO2 emissions will cause FDI inflows
in a specific sector. Our model is specified in Equations 4 and 5 in a bivariate VAR form,
but it can be extended to a multivariate form by expanding the number of regressors.
Since our main focus is on the impact of FDI on CO2 emissions, we limit our discussion
of Granger causality running from FDI to CO2 emissions. For the multivariate VAR,
following Talukdar and Meisner’s (2001) approach, we include GDP per capita growth
and the growth of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. Both indicators are
likely to be important determinants of pollution and CO2 levels.
The Granger causality test with fixed effects used in this analysis provides the
advantage of accounting for country characteristics and time effects. Including country
and time fixed effects in a panel VAR estimation allows us to deal with omitted variable
bias, an important aspect when considering causality.5 In particular, country fixed effects
control for characteristics that do not change for a given country, such as the proximity to

the US or other markets. The time effects control for events within a year that are
common to all the countries such as regional economic crisis or variations in oil prices.
Furthermore, an important condition for the validity of our analysis is that the
variables used in the analysis are stationary. We perform the panel unit root test that
assumes individual unit root processes proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) in the
following variables: FDI by sector in levels (all in natural logs), CO2 per capita growth,
CO2 to GDP ratio growth, GDP per capita growth, and manufacturing value added share
of GDP growth (for all variables, growth estimated as the first difference of the natural
log). We reject the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary at the 5 percent level
for all the variables. The number of lags included in the estimations is selected according
to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).

VI. Results
Table 4 presents the estimates of the Granger causality test with fixed effects
specified in the methodology section for the bivariate and multivariate VAR. The Table
presents the F test (along with the probability in parenthesis) and also, in brackets, the
table presents the addition of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressor in the
estimation (independent variable in the estimation). Number of lags and observations are
also provided in Table 4.

In Table 4, the estimates in column 1 present the Granger causality test when we use
total FDI inflows, and columns 2-4 when we use FDI in primary, secondary and tertiary
sectors. Estimates in column 5 of Table 4 are those derived from the Granger causality
test when we use the aggregated FDI inflows to dirty industries. Looking at the bivariate

VAR results, there is evidence that sectoral FDI Granger causes CO2 emissions in 2 cases
at the 5 percent level of significance. When using FDI in the tertiary and dirty sectors,
this null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. When looking at
causality running from CO2 emissions to sectoral FDI for the bivariate VAR, we find
that, at the 5 percent level, we do not reject the null hypothesis that CO2 emissions do not
Granger cause FDI.
For the purpose of robustness, we estimate the Granger causality test in a
multivariate VAR that includes the growth of GDP per capita and manufacturing value
added. Estimates of Granger causality test for the multivariate VAR are also shown in
Table 4. We find that the null hypothesis that FDI does not Granger cause CO2 emissions
is rejected only when we use FDI inflows in the dirty sector. For all the other estimations,
that use FDI in different sectors (total, primary, secondary, and tertiary), we fail to reject
the hypothesis that FDI does not Granger cause CO2 emissions. For the multivariate
VAR, we find that we fail to reject the hypothesis that CO2 emissions Granger cause FDI
in all cases.
We also explore whether our results are robust to using the growth of the ratio of
CO2 emissions to real GDP. This indicator is useful since changes in economic activity
can affect CO2 emissions, and it directly represents the emissions to output intensity of
production. Thus, cleaner technologies could be reflected in lower emissions of CO2 per
unit of real GDP. In Table 4, column 6 shows the estimates obtained for the Granger
causality test using the growth of the ratio of CO2 emissions to real GDP and FDI in dirty
sectors. When we use this alternative indicator of pollution emissions for the bivariate

and multivariate VAR, we only find evidence of causality running from FDI in dirty
sectors to CO2 emissions at the 1 percent level. This corroborates our previous results.6
The estimates for the bivariate and multivariate VAR models with aggregate FDI in
dirty industries are shown in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates for the
bivariate model (coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis). When having CO2
emissions as dependent variable in the bivariate VAR, we observe that the first and
second lag of FDI in dirty sectors is statistically significantly at the 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively. Estimates for the multivariate VAR are shown in columns 3 and 4. For the
multivariate VAR, we find that FDI in the dirty sector continues to have a significant
effect on CO2 emissions even when we control for other variables, where the second lag
of FDI in the dirty sector is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the control
variables, we find that the first lag of GDP per capita growth and the second lag of
manufacturing value added growth have a statistically significant positive effect on CO2
emissions at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Estimates from the bivariate VAR
when we use the growth of the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP are shown in columns 5
and 6. These estimates are very similar to those shown in columns 1 and 2 for the
bivariate VAR with CO2 emissions per capita. When using growth of the ratio of CO2
emissions to GDP, we find that the first lag of FDI in the dirty sector has a significant
positive effect on CO2 emissions at the 10 percent level, while the second and third lag
have a significant effect at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
It is necessary to discuss the magnitude of the effect that FDI in the dirty sector has
on CO2 emissions. Using the estimates shown in Table 4 for the bivariate VAR (where
the growth of CO2 emissions per capita is the dependent variable and FDI in the dirty

sector in the independent variable), we find the following effect for the average country.
An increase on FDI in the dirty sector as share of GDP by one standard deviation
increases CO2 emissions per capita by 0.96 percent in the next two periods after the initial
increase on FDI in the dirty sector. An increase on CO2 emissions per capita of 0.96
percent for the average country represents an increase of 0.03 emissions of CO2 metric
tons per capita. This effect is of significant magnitude considering that for 2007, the
emissions of CO2 ranged between 1 and 2 metric tons per capita for the majority of the
countries in the sample (13 out of 18 have a value in this range).
In summary, our analysis shows that there is robust evidence that FDI in the dirty
sector Granger causes CO2 emissions. This suggests that as FDI in the dirty sector
increases, CO2 emissions are likely to increase, even after controlling for country and
time specific characteristics. Thus, in line with MacDermott’s (2006) analysis for
Mexico, our results suggest that there may be a significant negative environmental impact
of FDI inflows in dirty sectors for the Latin American region. However, we find no
robust effect of FDI in other sectors on CO2 emissions. Our results at first sight contrast
with some of the previous findings by Grossman and Krueger (1991); Carrada-Bravo
(1995); Birdsall, et al. (2001); Albornoz, et al., (2009). However, these studies did not
considered the role of dirty industries separately and the possible endogeneity in the FDIpollution relationship.

VII. Concluding Remarks

FDI to LDCs has increased over the last decades. As a result, academics and policy
makers are interested on determining the environmental effects of these flows. In this

paper, we analyze the relationship between FDI and CO2 concentrations in Latin America
from 1980 to 2007 and provide insights on the environmental effect of FDI.
We find evidence that, in the case of some Latin American countries, FDI inflows in
pollution intensive industries can be linked to increases in CO2 emissions per capita and
per unit of GDP. Distinguishing the environmental effect of FDI by sectors is relevant for
policymakers. It is unlikely that Latin American countries would want to restrict the
inflows of FDI in the pollution intensive sectors since this form of investment represents
a large share of total FDI. In our sample, about 37 percent of total FDI inflows have, on
average, gone to pollution intensive industries.
An important policy implication of our analysis is that FDI in pollution intensive
industries should be closely monitored. It is relevant for governments in the region to be
aware of the detrimental effects that this form of FDI has on the environment. The
creation of a fund for environmental improvement in these countries might be a possible
policy action that will ensure better environmental conditions in the region. The size of
this fund should be dependent on the amount of FDI in the polluting sectors and
estimations of the environmental damage associated with the increase in CO2 emissions,
where the public and private sector can contribute.
While our analysis shows that FDI in pollution intensive sectors causes higher CO2
emissions in Latin America, we are unable to directly support or reject the pollution
haven or pollution halo hypothesis. The lack of readily available firm level data for Latin
America does not allow us to empirically test these hypotheses.

Endnotes
1

This information was obtained by calculating percentages of FDI flows using data from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2011).
2
It is important to note, however, that developing countries can work together with
developed countries under the mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol and reduce emissions
that will count toward developed countries quota. For example, China is the largest CO2
emitter and while it has not signed specific agreements to cut back emissions, it has been
willing to compromise in this issue.
3
Mexico and Brazil emit more than 100 million metric tons of carbon. CDIAC reports
that six other countries in the region are now emitting more than 10 million metric tons of
carbon annually: Argentina (50.1), Venezuela (45.1), Chile (19.6), Colombia (17.3), Peru
(11.7), and Trinidad and Tobago (10.1).
4
Not all 18 countries and not all years are included in all the estimations due to data
unavailability.
5
Refer to Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion on fixed effects model in a panel
framework and to Holtz et al. (1988) for a discussion on the benefits of using fixed
effects in a panel VAR.
6
Other estimations using the growth of the ratio of CO2 to GDP and FDI in different
sectors are not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request
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Figure 1 – Regional FDI total and disaggregated by more (less) pollution intensive
industries*

* Source: UNCTAD/DITE.
Figure 2 – FDI flows to dirty industries as a share of total FDI to Latin America*
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Figure 3 – FDI to Latin America by Industry (Pollution Intensive Sectors)*
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Table 1 – Pollution Intensive Industries by Selected Study.
Study
SIC of Dirty Industries
Akbostanci et al
Basic Industrial Chemicals (3511); Fertilizers and Pesticides (3512); Iron
(2007)
and Steel (3710); Nonferrous Metal (3720)
List et al (2004); List Pulp and Paper Mills (2611-31); Printing and Binding (2711-89); Industrial
and Millimet (2004) Inorganic Chemicals (2812-19); Industrial Organic Chemicals (2861-69);
Petroleum Refining (2911); Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics (30); Stone,
Clay, and Glass (32); Steel and Electrometallurgical Products(3312-3); Iron
and Steel Foundries(3321-5); Fabricated Metal Products (34); Motor
Vehicles and Equipment(371)
Kahn (2003)
Primary Metals; Stone, Clay and Glass Products; Petroleum and Coal;
Chemical and Allied Products; Textile Mill Products.
Greenstone (2002) Printing (2711-89); Organic Chemicals (2861-9); Rubber and
Miscellaneous Plastic Products (30); Fabricated Metals (34), Motor
Vehicles, Bodies, and Parts (371); Inorganic Chemicals (2812-9); Lumber
and Wood Products (24); Nonferrous Metals (333-4); Petroleum Refining
(2911); Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete (32); and Pulp and Paper (261131) and Iron and Steel (3312-3 and 3321-5).
Kolstad and Xin
High: Chemicals and Allied Products; Primary Metals Industries.
(2002)
Moderate: Food and Kindred Products; Industrial Machinery and
Equipment; Electronic and Other Electric Equipment; Transportation
Equipment.
Becker and
Industrial Organic Chemicals (2865 and 2869); Miscellaneous Plastic
Henderson (2000)
Products (308), Metal Cans and Barrels 3411 and 3412); Wood Furniture
(2511); Commercial Printing, Gravure (2754); Motor Vehicle and Car
Bodies (3711)
List & Co (2000)
Fabricated Meal Products (34); Stone, Clay, and Glass Products (32); Paper
and Allied Products (26); Transportation Equipment (37); Primary Metal
Industries (33); Chemicals and Allied Products (28); Petroleum and Coal
Products (29).
Mani and Wheeler Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals, Industrial Chemicals, Pulp and Paper,
(1998)
and Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Levinson (1996)
Petroleum and Coal (29); Chemicals (28); Primary Metals (33)
Jaffe et al (1995)
High: Paper and Allied Products; Chemical and Allied Products; Petroleum
and Coal Products; Primary Metal Industries. Moderate: Furniture and
Fixtures; Fabricated Metal Products; Electric, Electronic Equipment
Tobey (1990)
Iron Ore, Concentrates (281); Ores of Nonferrous Base Metals (283);
Silver, Platinum, etc (681); Copper (682); Nickel (683); Lead (685); Zinc
(686); Tin (687); Nonferrous Base Metals (689) , Pulp and Waste Paper
(251); Paper and Paperboard (641); Articles of Paper (642); Pig Iron (671);
Ingots (672); Iron and Steel Bars (673); Universal, plates (674); Hoops and
Strips (675); Railway Material (676); Iron and Steel Wire (677); Tubes and
Fittings (678); Iron, Steel Castings (679); Inorganic Elements (513); Other
Inorganic Chemicals (514); Plastic Materials (581)

Table 2. Variable Description
Variable
Description
CO2 per capita Log difference of CO2 emissions per capita (metric tons per capita).
growth
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010).
CO2 RGDP
share growth

Log difference of CO2 emissions as a share of real GDP (CO2 emissions kg per
2005 PPP $ of GDP).
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010).

FDI total
(% GDP)*

Log of the total FDI inflows as a share of GDP.
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).

FDI primary
(% GDP)*

Log of the total FDI inflows in primary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI primary
we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and
fishing, and *2) mining, quarrying and petroleum.
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).

FDI secondary
(% GDP)

Log of the total FDI inflows in secondary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary
we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) food, beverages and tobacco, 2)
textiles, clothing and leather, *3) wood and wood products, *4) paper and paper
products, *5) chemicals and chemical products, 6) rubber and plastic products, *7)
non-metallic mineral products, *8) metal and metal products, 9) machinery and
equipment, *10) electrical and electronic equipment, and *11) motor vehicles and
other transport equipment.
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).

FDI tertiary
(% GDP)

Log of the total FDI inflows in tertiary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary we
aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) electricity, gas and water, 2)
construction, 3) trade, 4) hotels and restaurants, 5) transport, storage and
communications, and 5) finance.
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).

FDI dirty
(% GDP)

Log of the total FDI inflows in dirty industries as a share of GDP. For FDI dirty we
aggregate FDI in the categories denoted above with “*”.
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).

GDP growth

Log difference of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars).
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010).

Manuf. val.
add. growth

Log difference of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP.
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010).

FDI aggregation by sector is done adding the available observations with a positive value. Variable is
truncated for non-positive values in order to take natural log (a value of 1E-11 is assigned for nonpositive values). Series filled in with linear interpolation for missing observations.

Table 3. Summary Statistics

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max.

Min.

Obs.

Log and difference transformation (series used in the analysis)
Transformation
Variable name
CO2 per capita growth
D(Ln(CO2 per capita))
CO2 RGDP share
D(Ln(CO2 per real GDP))
FDI total (% GDP)
Ln(FDI total)
FDI primary (% GDP)
Ln(FDI primary)
FDI secondary (% GDP) Ln(FDI secondary)
FDI tertiary (% GDP)
Ln(FDI tertiary)
FDI dirty (% GDP)
Ln(FDI dirty)
GDP per capita growth
D(Ln(GDP per capita))
Manuf. val. add. growth
D(Ln(Manuf. val. add. share))

0.013
0.002
0.297
-2.942
-2.147
-1.233
-1.691
0.011
-0.009

0.103
0.100
3.649
7.135
5.537
4.580
4.782
0.044
0.096

0.511
0.534
2.858
2.804
1.325
2.612
2.807
0.150
0.529

-0.593
-0.619
-30.542
-30.752
-29.703
-29.954
-30.752
-0.164
-0.692

486
486
381
355
361
381
327
486
407

Raw series
Variable name
CO2 per capita
CO2 GDP share
FDI total (% GDP)
FDI primary (% GDP)
FDI secondary (% GDP)
FDI tertiary (% GDP)
FDI dirty (% GDP)
GDP per capita
Manuf. val. add.

2.913
0.360
3.128
1.053
0.624
1.373
1.165
3111.2
18.163

3.952
0.259
2.745
1.782
0.644
1.869
1.873
1942.7
5.654

27.862
1.573
17.421
16.515
3.760
13.630
16.555
10738.0
34.560

0.325
0.091
5.44E-14
4.41E-14
1.26E-13
9.8E-14
4.41E-14
632.5
5.548

504
504
381
355
361
381
327
504
426

Transformation
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

Summary statistics of available observations for 18 countries, between the period 1980-2007

Table 4. Granger Causality Test
FDI Total
(1)

FDI Prim
(2)

Null Hypothesis: FDI does not Granger-cause CO2 growth
Bivariate
1.395
2.609
(0.249)
(0.076)
[0.003]
[0.002]
<2, 337>
<2, 313>
Multivariate

0.342
(0.795)
[-0.002]
<3, 282>

0.894
(0.410)
[0.0014]
<2, 275>

Null Hypothesis: CO2 growth does not Granger-cause FDI
Bivariate
0.790
0.225
(0.455)
(0.798)
[1.598]
[3.236]
<2, 352>
<2, 328>
Multivariate

FDI Sec
(3)

FDI Ter
(4)

FDI Dirty
(5)

FDI Dirty
(6)

0.195
(0.900)
[0.001]
<3, 300>

4.058
(0.018)
[-0.003]
<2, 337>

7.229
(0.000)
[0.006]
<3, 272>

7.241
(0.000)
[0.008]
<3, 272>

0.817
(0.486)
[-0.001]
<3, 264>

1.741
(0.178)
[-0.002]
<2, 299>

7.355
(0.001)
[0.003]
<2, 253>

6.717
(0.002)
[0.004]
<2, 253>

2.089
(0.102)
[1.607]
<3, 314>

0.296
(0.744)
[1.267]
<2, 352>

0.356
(0.785)
[-3.794]
<3, 285>

0.374
-0.772
[-3.268]
<3, 285>

0.818
0.038
1.699
0.545
0.583
0.583
(0.485)
(0.963)
(0.168)
(0.580)
(0.559)
-0.559
[7.110]
[1.839]
[3.474]
[2.481]
[-4.981]
[-4.981]
<3, 296>
<2, 290>
<3, 277>
<2, 314>
<2, 266>
<2, 266>
F-values with probabilities in parenthesis and the sum of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressors in brackets. Lag and
observation numbers indicated by <lag, obs>. Granger causality test estimated with country-time fixed effects and one FDI indicator
at the time (in logs). We use the growth of CO2 per capita for estimations in columns 1 through 5, while column 6 we use the growth
of CO2 as a share of real GDP.

Table 5. VAR Estimates
Bivariate
(CO2 per capita)

Multivariate
(CO2 per capita)

Bivariate
(CO2 GDP share)

0.001
0.002

(0.002)
(0.001) ***

-0.097
-0.205

(0.075)
(0.069) ***

0.002
0.002
0.003
-0.287
-0.389
-0.041

(0.001) *
(0.001) ***
(0.001) **
(0.115) ***
(0.077) ***
(0.086)

0.293
0.169
0.044
0.132
0.004
0.250
253

(0.144) **
(0.108)
(0.052)
(0.050) ***
(0.006)

0.122
0.296
272

(0.026) ***

0.334
0.139

(0.282)
(0.219)

-3.979
-1.002

(3.972)
(3.281)

0.413
-0.129
0.364
-3.044
-0.577
0.353

(0.201) **
(0.153)
(0.213) *
(3.444)
(3.577)
(2.181)

-5.500
0.409
285

(3.724)

Dependent variable: CO2 growth
FDI dirty t-1
FDI dirty t-2
FDI dirty t-3
CO2 growth t-1
CO2 growth t-2
CO2 growth t-3
GDP per capita growth t-1
GDP per capita growth t-2
Manuf. val. add. growth t-1
Manuf. val. add. growth t-2
Constant
R-sq
Obs

0.002
0.002
0.002
-0.276
-0.337
-0.013

(0.001) **
(0.001) ***
(0.001)
(0.106) ***
(0.086) ***
(0.084)

0.120 (0.023) ***
0.246
272

Dependent variable: FDI
FDI dirty t-1
FDI dirty t-2
FDI dirty t-3
CO2 growth t-1
CO2 growth t-2
CO2 growth t-3
GDP per capita growth t-1
GDP per capita growth t-2
Manuf. val. add. growth t-1
Manuf. val. add. growth t-2
Constant
R-sq
Obs

0.412
-0.129
0.366
-1.694
-2.028
-0.072

(0.204) **
(0.157)
(0.215) *
(2.228)
(2.124)
(1.889)

-5.459 (3.794)
0.407
285

22.682 (11.517) **
-11.620 (12.490)
1.557 (1.725)
2.802 (2.277)
2.258 (1.202) *
0.474
266

VAR model estimated with country-time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ‘***’,
‘**’, '*" denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. We use the growth of CO2 per capita
in the first two sets of estimations, while we use the growth of CO2 as a share of GDP for the last
set of estimates.

